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Abstract
The regulation of home country to govern business and human rights has been commonly
debated. It is argued that home states regulations have a potential role to play in the regulation
of multinationals on business and human rights. It particularly can fill the gap due to the
extraterritorial nature of MNC operations which requires an integrated regulatory approach
and it can also provide alternative forum for victims to human rights violation by corporation
to seek justice. The question is in what sense home states should be responsible for violations
of human rights by subsidiaries in host countries. What are the justifications and what are the
limitations? This article tries to answer those questions by highlighting the debates over the duty
bearer, a right or obligations of home countries to impose extraterritorial regulations to other
countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the problematic and major issues in the context of business
and human rights is the regulatory framework. There are a number of
regulations that international businesses need to respect, and these are
both national and international in nature. First, a corporation should
respect national legislation in which it is operating in various fields
such as taxation, labour protection, environmental standards, etc.
However, there are several problems facing such regulation: who
should regulate multinationals as a whole considering its multi-national
business operations? Is it the obligation of home or host countries?
Some countries have attempted to propose and apply a law which
could regulate their companies overseas.1 Even so, the extent to which
European Union, Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating
in Developing Countries, Towards a European Code of Conduct, C 104/180, 14 January 1999; Deva, Surya, “Acting Extraterritorial to Tame Multinational Corporations
for Human Rights Violations: Who Should ‘Bell the Cat’?,” Melbourne Journal of
International Law 5 (2004), pp. 52 - 54.
1
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such extraterritorial jurisdiction can be exercised remains unclear.
Civil society and academics have gathered and developed Maastricht
Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligation of States in the Area of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights calling for all states to meet its
extraterritorial obligations. Nevertheless, the question is whether such
obligations have a legal foundation supported by state practices. This is
the question which is further developed in this article.
For the purpose of this article, there are several clarifications which
have to be made. First, the wording ‘human rights’ refers to the human
rights articulated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and
other human rights instruments. This article will only focus on the
economic, social, and cultural rights as articulated in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Second, bearing
in mind the varieties of definitions of Multinational Corporations or
(MNC),2 this research will focus on MNC in which the parent companies
or home companies are normally established in a developed state and
their subsidiaries in developing states. This definition thus reflects both
the corporate body as a whole and its separate entities, which might
operate either individually or collectively, by embracing the realities
of complex structure, control, and operation. Last, the analysis applies
the construction of law as found in international law which is viewed
broadly as a dynamic decision-making process involving various
bodies of law and policies resulted from interactions between different
participants.3 Here, it is assumed that international law is binding states
— and to some extent, individuals — including legal entities within a
state.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF HOME COUNTRY
Why is home state regulation important in the context of corporate
human rights responsibility? The answer is more pragmatic than
theoretical. Placing a regulatory burden exclusively on host countries
is quite problematic and inefficient, due to the extraterritorial nature
Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: Continuous
Search for A Regulatory Framework (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009), 22–27.
3
Waagstein, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: Continuous Search for A Regulatory Framework, 31–37.
2
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of MNC operations which requires an integrated regulatory approach.
Many cases reveal that subsidiaries may easily close down their
operations and move to different countries, all the while leaving the
home state untouched. In this case, the main concern is the victims to
human rights violation whose access to justice may be limited.
A second functional difficulty is that many host countries are
also developing countries, which often face economic and political
difficulties. The conflict of interest between economic and human rights,
limited natural resources, or simply pressure from other institutions
has hindered the application and protection of human rights in host
countries. It is argued in this article that home state regulation can
provide a partial solution to the loopholes created by such a regulatory
vacuum.
Third, from the victim’s perspective, the possibility of adjudication
against a parent corporation in its home country has opened a window to
seeking justice that may not be readily available in one’s own country.
Thus, extending regulation to home states strengthens the relative
position of those victims.
III.DEFINING HOME COUNTRY
What is home country? The term ‘home country’ is always associated
with the nationality of a corporation. Some commentators have argued
that nationality of MNC should be irrelevant, since the former is
inherently obscure4 and fails to reflect the complicated structure of
MNC.5 However, in the normative sense of the segregation of state
authority, this concept remains important. In international law, knowing
which state a particular entity belongs to is a condition for entitlement
of state responsibility, diplomatic protection and judicial proceedings,
jurisdiction,6 and enemy status in time of war. Moreover, this nationality
Nigh, Douglas, “Who’s on First? Nation-States, National Identity and Multinational
Corporations,” International Business: Institutions and the Dissemination of Knowledge, eds. Brian Toyne and Douglas William Nigh (South Carolina: University of
South Carolina Press, 1999), p. 263.
5
Ibid.
6
Permanent Court of International Justice, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and
Marocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 1921, 1923, PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 4.
4
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is also important when determining the law to be applied, restrictions
on MNC, and jurisdiction over companies abroad.
Unlike individual nationality, where state practices provide
consistent criteria, determining the nationality of a corporation is far
more complicated. Three basic considerations are commonly used
to determine the linkage between state and corporation: place of
incorporation,7 place of management,8 and place of control/shareholder
location.9
A. THE PLACE OF INCORPORATION
The state of incorporation refers to the place where the corporation
was created as a legal entity. The conferring of legal status – which
expresses the juridical link with the country – indicates that the law of the
country is also the abiding law of the company.10 This practice is common
in common law countries and with some international instruments. It
makes sense that the corporation, logically speaking, would be a ‘legal
entity’ or ‘citizen’ only of the state whose laws created it. This is also
easily ascertainable, as it requires no further examination of the place of
management, internal corporate organisation, and procedure. As such,
it offers a measure of legal certainty and predictability in choice of law
matters for both state administrators and regulated firms.11 Nevertheless,
there are criticisms. Today, this model does not necessarily reflect the
Lowe, Vaughan, “Jurisdiction,” International Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans, Second
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 345 & 346; Kokkini-Iatridou, D. and
Waart, P.J.I.M de, “Foreign Investment in Developing Countries - Legal Personality
of Multinational Corporations in International Law,” Netherland Yearbook of International Law 14 (1993), pp. 96 & 97.
7

8

Wallace, Cynthia Day, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2002),
p. 134.

International Court of Justice, The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company,
Limited (Belgium V. Spain), Judgment, 1962, I.C.J. Report 19.
10
Kokkini-Iatridou, D. and Waart, P.J.I.M de, “Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries - Legal Personality of Multinational Corporations in International Law,”
Netherland Yearbook of International Law 14 (1993), pp. 96 & 97.
11
Rammeloo, Stephann, Corporation in Private International Law; a European Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 17; Mabry, Linda A., “Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality,” Georgetown Law Journal 87 (1998 - 1999), p. 584.
9
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day-to-day dynamics of a corporation. Many corporations are completely
inactive in the particular place of incorporation, effectively making it a
fiction construction (albeit, not necessarily unlawful). Therefore, it is
argued, using the place of incorporation as the sole determinant of a
corporation’s nationality is not sufficient. As the lex societatis or place
of management has become more important, it is increasingly argued
that there should be other ways of defining this status.
B. THE PLACE OF MANAGEMENT OR REAL SEAT
This approach argues that the decisive factor for determining
corporate nationality should be based on the place where the effective
connection between corporation and the claiming state has been
established; namely, the place of corporate management or the real seat.
One interpretation of this defines the ‘seat’ as the location of central
management or administration, from which control is effectively
exercised.12 Another regards it as the site of production facilities.13
However, in both cases there is a question of whether this would mean
a corporation’s headquarters, or the meeting place of directors and/or
shareholders. Here, there is no agreement. Although most European
countries have come to regard the place of central administration as
a decisive determinant,14 their ultimate definition is unclear. Even
assuming that a semantic consensus is possible, it is convincingly argued
that in the globalized business world it is often difficult to determine the
actual location of a company’s real seat. Business undertakings cannot
be expected to operate in solely one market over time.
C. THE PLACE OF SHAREHOLDERS & CONTROL
The concept of shareholders/control as a criterion for determining
the nationality of corporations is an exception to the principle of
the corporate veil, that separates the corporation from its members
and endows it with rights and duties of its own. This approach was
developed with the goal of protecting national security and economic
interests from hostile foreign armies, and was applied in the context of
Wallace, Cynthia Day, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State
Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2002), p. 134.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
12

365

Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein

wartime to control enemy trade and property ownership. There are some
practical difficulties with this conception, however. Discerning the
identity and nationality of individual shareholders, as well as directors
with the power to influence key decisions, is becoming increasingly
difficult. The growing number of corporations, and the extensive
networks of interrelated companies whose shares are traded daily
among stockholders around the globe or held by institutional investors,
can make this a complicated task.
D. MULTIPLE APPROACHES
While the tests above constitute some criteria for determining
corporate nationality in state practice, in practice, each approach must
be applied in combination with others. Civil law countries which
commonly apply the real seat normally require incorporation in the
same state, making the ultimate ‘test’ for either approach virtually
identical.15 This is also the case with common law countries.16 In the
case of international claims for compensation, the Iran-United States
Tribunal requires that the claimant be a national of the United States
(against Iran) or a national of Iran (against the United States) based
on all tests: the place of incorporation, the place of management and
the nationality of shareholder.17 In the context of diplomatic protection,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of Barcelona Traction
establishes that international law ‘attributes the right of diplomatic
protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it

Wallace, Cynthia Day, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State
Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2002), p. 134.
16
Restatement of the Third Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States Restatement of the Law, ed. The American Law Institute, vol. 1 (St Paul, American Law
Institute Publishers, 1986), Section 213 on Nationality of Corporation.
17
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran article II paragraph 1
and article VII paragraph 1 and 2. Also see: Aldrich, George H., The Jurisprudence
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 44 54; Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh
Revised ed. (London, Rautledge, 1997), pp. 266 & 267.
15
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is incorporated and in whose territory has its registered office.’18 The
basic premises of the Barcelona Traction case have been consistently
applied by the International Law Commission (ILC), on its Draft [of]
Diplomatic Protection (2006). While this Draft law applied those three
tests, the state of incorporation should be applied first.19 However,
when the corporation is controlled by nationals of other states and has
no substantial business activities in the state of incorporation, and the
site of management and financial control is located in another state,
the place of management test should be applied.20 Finally, the place
of shareholders test can only be applied in exceptional cases; namely,
when a corporation ceases to exist or there is direct injury toward
shareholders.21
These elaborations signify that in international law, there is no
common regulation regarding the approaches used to determine
corporate nationality. The factors considered depend upon the context
of the particular rules of law involved.22 Consequently, it is difficult to
pinpoint which state is a corporation’s home state, since this could be
represented by the state of incorporation, state of management, or state
of shareholders. This flexibility approach enables victims to redress
claims against MNCs in different places.
IV. JUSTIFYING EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION UNDER HUMAN
RIGHTS
It should be kept in mind here that the jurisdictional question on
human rights, while overlapping, ultimately differs from the doctrine of
jurisdiction, which allows states to prescribe regulation extraterritorially
International Court of Justice, The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company,
Limited (Belgium V. Spain), Judgment, 1962, I.C.J. Report 19, para. 70.
19
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, ifty-eight session sess., UN GA A/61/10, 2006, Draft Article 9.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., Draft Article 11.
22
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, Fourth ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Express, 1990), p. 422.
18
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based on nationality, protection, and universal principles. In the latter
case, the doctrine describes the limits of legal competence of a state to
regulate conduct or the consequences of events,23 and jurisdiction is its
authority to effect legal interests over certain conduct. In the context of
human rights, this is quite different. Here, the jurisdictional question
refers to the web of protection of individuals by various states, in which
one state’s protection ends where another state’s begins.24 Accordingly,
jurisdiction is aimed to ‘delineate as appropriately as possible the
pool of persons to which a state ought to secure human rights.’25 In
other words, jurisdiction in human rights regimes is perceived as an
opportunity, rather than limitation, to extend individual protection.
When, then, do states have the obligation to regulate MNC operating
abroad? The Maastricht Principles, although initiated by civil society,
provide a guideline on the scope of extraterritorial regulations:
1. Jurisdiction based on effective control over territory
It has been recognised under international law that under certain
circumstances, a state can be found to have obligations outside its
territory toward non-national entities in instances where it exercises
‘effective control.’ Occupation and control of military or paramilitary
forces are often cited as the clearest examples of states exercising
effective control. In the 1971 ICJ case on Advisory Opinion on the
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) involving the illegal occupation
of Namibia by South Africa, the ICJ confirms that the ‘physical control
of a territory and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis for
The term ‘jurisdiction’ is also commonly used in international law to describe
the scope of the rights of an international tribunal, such as the International Court of
Justice of the International Criminal Court, to adjudicate on cases and to make orders
in respect of the parties to them. See : Lowe, Vaughan, “Jurisdiction,” International
Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans, Second ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.
335 & 336.
24
Skogly, Sigrun I., Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in
International Cooperation (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2006), p. 45.
25
Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg:
2008), pp. 11 & 12.
23

368

Justifying Extraterritorial Regulations of Home Country

State liability for acts affecting other states. ‘26 The Court also stated
that South Africa remained accountable for any violations of the rights
of the people of Namibia.27
In human rights regimes, several forms of jurisprudence from
different organs apply the same principle of state’s effective control
to establish extraterritorial human rights obligations. In the 1981 case
of Lopex Burgos v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee (HRC)
expanded the interpretation of Article 2 of the ICCPR to include any
‘violations of rights under the Covenant which its [state] agents commit
upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of
the Government of that State or in opposition to it.28 In the case of the
West Bank and Gaza, the Human Rights Committee applied the same
approach, concluding that Israel was responsible for all conduct of its
authorities or agents in those territories under its control that affected
the enjoyment of rights under the Covenant.29
In the context of the European Court of Human Rights, the concept
of extraterritorial obligation based on state control has been consistently
applied in various cases. In the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, involving
the confiscation of property in Turkish-occupied areas of Northern
Cyprus, the European Court of Human Rights held that responsibility
for one’s own acts can reach outside one’s territory, provided that it has
effective control over the territory where the act occurred regardless of
the legality of such control. 30 The same position has been confirmed in
the more recent case of Cyprus v. Turkey. 31 In the well-known Bankovic
International Court of Justice Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1971, para. 118.
27
Ibid., paras. 109 & 112.
28
052/1979, Delia Saldias de Lopez (alleged victim’s wife) on behalf of Sergio Ruben
Lopex Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, para. 12.1. and 12.30.
29
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Resports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant; Concluding Observation of the Human Rights
Committee, Israel, Seventy-eight sess., CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, para. 11.
30
Clarkson, Max B.E., “A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and Evaluating
Corporate Social Performance,” Academy of Management Review 20.1 (1995), p. 62.
31
European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus V. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Jugdment of 10 May 2001, 2001, p. 77. Emphasis added.
26

369

Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein

case, involving victims’ complaints relating to the NATO attack in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the European Court of Human Rights
went further by allowing
[...]its recognition of the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State,
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants
abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercise all or
some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.32

Despite the criticism of Bankovic per se,33 this case highlights three
important issues. First, it confirmed that an extraterritorial obligation
exists as a general exception. This decision opens the possibility for
future complaints relating to peacekeeping operations where the armed
forces of a Contracting party exercise all or some of the public power in
a specific region.34 Apparently, the Bankovic case has been referenced
by Saddam Hussein to seek claims for human rights violations under the
protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and
on the basis of effective de facto control over Iraq by European countries.
The Court concluded that due to the lack of clarity on the division of
responsibility and power among the United States of America (USA)
and European countries involved in peacekeeping operations there,
it was not clear whether there was a jurisdictional link for European

European Court of Human Rights, Bankovic A.O. V. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Appl. no. 52207/99; adc.dec., judgment of 12 December 2001, 2001,
para. 71.
33
Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg:
2008), discussion paper - unpublished; Scheinin, Martin, “Comments on ‘Jurisdiction,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human Rights Obligations in the
Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg, the Netherlands: 2008), discussion paper - unpublished.
34
Lawson, Rick A., “The Concept of Jurisdiction in the European Convention on
Human Rights,” Globalisation and Jurisdiction, eds. Piet jan Slot and Mielle Bulterman (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2004), p. 209. See also: European Court of
Human Rights, Markovic and Others V. Italy, Application No. 1398/03, judgment on
14 December 2006, 2006.
32
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countries in this case under Article 1,35 and therefore, the application
was dismissed. Second, unlike earlier cases such as Loizidou vs. Turkey
and Cyprus v. Turkey, where both the applicant state and respondent
state were parties to the Convention, the Bankovic case involved two
European counterparties before the Court, only one of whom was a
signatory to the Convention. The case challenged the territorial concept
upon which the ECHR was based, under Art. 1(2) of the ECHR, and
questioned the scope of the Convention’s application to a third party.
Can the doctrine of effective control over territory be applied in
the context of ESC rights? The answer is yes. Although there is no
clear reference for the ICESCR’s scope of application, the fact cannot
be denied that this instrument guarantees rights which are essentially
territorial. Based on several pieces of evidence, it can be confirmed
that the ICESCR applies both to territories over which a state has
sovereignty, and those over which that state exercises territorial
jurisdiction. Article 14 of the ICESCR gives transitional directions
in the case of any state which ‘at the time of becoming a party, has
not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories
under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge.’36
Further confirmation can be found in the Maastricht Guidelines, which
state that ‘under circumstances of alien domination, deprivation of
economic, social, and cultural rights may be imputable to the conduct
of the State exercising effective control over the territory in question.’37
However, the application is limited to the contexts of ‘colonialism,
other forms of alien domination and military occupation.’38 Moreover,
the ICESCR, observing Israel’s periodic reports, clearly adopts effective
control in reconfirming its view that : ‘the state party’s obligation
European Court of Human Rights Saddam Hussein V. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukranine, and the United Kingdom, Fourth Section Decision as to the Admissibility of
Application no. 23276/04 on 14 March 2006, 2006.
36
International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004, Reports of Judgment, Advisory Opinion
and Order of 9 July 2004, para. 112.
37
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
1997, para. 17.
38
Ibid.
35
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under the ICESCR apply to all territories and populations under its
effective control.’39 This concluding observation was reiterated by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), when giving an advisory opinion on
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. In this case, which involved the question of
whether international human rights law, particularly the ICCPR,
ICESCR, and the CRC, applied extraterritorially in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, the ICJ concluded that ‘the protection offered by human
rights conventions does not cease in the case of armed conflict’ and that
‘the territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subjected
to its territorial jurisdiction as the occupying power.’40 Consequently,
Israel was responsible under the ICCPR, ICESCR, and CRC regarding
the human rights consequences of the Wall’s construction. Although
the Court specifies certain rights that impacted the occupation, it is not
clear exactly what type of obligations the occupying state held. The
Court only states that Israel is ‘under an obligation not to raise any
obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence
has been transferred to Palestinian authorities.’41 The assumption here
is that the Court merely imposes the negative obligation namely the
obligation to respect and protect human rights. 42
Likewise, in the case of the Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo, although the Court was not specifically dealing with the
ICESCR, the applicability of effective control in human rights regime
was reconfirmed:
178. The Court thus concludes that Uganda was the occupying Power in
Ituri at the relevant time. As such it was under an obligation, according to
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Resports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant; Concluding Observation of the Human Rights
Committee, Israel, Seventy-eight sess., CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, paras. 15
& 31.
40
International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004, Reports of Judgment, Advisory Opinion
and Order of 9 July 2004, para. 112.
41
Ibid.
42
Narula, Smita, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2005 - 2007), p. 734.
39
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the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect
for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any
third party.43

This case highlights two points. First, it is reconfirmed that the
meaning of ‘territory’ has been extended to include the occupying
territory. Consequently, the occupying power should also be responsible
for any occurrence and subject within its ‘extra’ territory. Second,
the ICJ clearly establishes that states have multiple obligations, both
positive and negative, toward non-nationals outside their territory. 44
With regard to business actors, paragraph 178 can be interpreted further
as imposing obligations to states to regulate business actors operating in
such outside territory and to adjudicate any cases involving violations
by business actors.
Though international human rights jurisprudence tells us that a state
can exercise ‘effective control’ over territory in the case of occupation
or armed conflict, its utility is very limited in the context of corporate
responsibility and ESC rights, since the majority of extraterritorial
regulations do not involve these limited scenarios, but rather concern
economic issues. For the effective control doctrine to be more useful
in the case of ESC rights protection, then, it would need to include
situations in which states exercise effective economic control over
policies or markets outside their territory.45 Here, applying an economic
control standard to define the jurisdictional scope of human rights
regulations could fill the gap resulting from extraterritorial economic
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nation
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Sectoral Consultation Entitled ‘Human
Rights and the Extractive Industry’, pt. E/CN.4/2006/92, U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2006/92,
19 December 2005.
44
Clapham, Andrew, “Rights and Responsibility : A Legal Perspective,” From Rights
to Responsibilities: Rethinking Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes, eds. O. Jutersonke and K. Krause, vol. PSIS Special Study 7 (Geneva: Programme for Strategic
and International Security Studies, 2006), p. 66.
45
Narula, Smita, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under
International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2005 - 2007), pp.
734 & 735.
43
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impacts.46 Moreover, using effective economic control as a basis for
state’s obligation to regulate and adjudicate would partly resolve the
conflict of jurisdiction.
2. Jurisdiction based on ‘effective control’ or ‘foreseeable
consequence” over persons
There are two references already made to state responsibility which
need to be mentioned again in this context: the ICJ case of Nicaragua
v. United States and the ICTY case of Tadic . Although the latter case
provides ‘looser standards’ by relying on overall control rather than
effective control, both cases demand direct participation by the relevant
party in order to invoke responsibility. Can either be applied to help
determine the connection between a corporation and home country?
Despite the difference between these two cases – one determining state
responsibility and the other individual responsibility –neither one can be
easily applied to this particular scenario, since in most cases corporations
enjoy the autonomy to arrange management and operation. Even if home
states intervene to regulate corporate behaviour, their involvement is
limited. Although one can argue for corporations’ occasional control by
government where that government is the main shareholder, and other
situations in which states are controlled by corporate interests; these
serve as exceptions to the rule.
The state’s control over a person has also been applied to various
degrees by the European Court on Human Rights and Human Rights
Committee. In the case of Soering,47 the European Court on Human
Rights held that the extradition of a German national by the United
Narula, Smita, “The Jurisdictional Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational
Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg, Netherland: 2008); Narula, Smita, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors
Accountable under International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 44
(2005 - 2007), p. 734.
47
The case is about a German national detained in the UK, who could not be extradited to Virginia in the United States in order to stand trial for murder, and possibly
be sentenced to death. The question remains as to whether the extradition of a fugitive
to another State where he would be subjected or likely be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, or punishment, would engage the responsibility of a
Contracting State under Article 3 ECHR. Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161.
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Kingdom’s government to Virginia constituted a violation of Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Right. This case carries two
important implications. First, the decision of this case is based on physical
control over a legal person,48 meaning that the UK is responsible for a
German national due to his physical presence in the United Kingdom.
Second, the case is based on the foreseeable consequence argument,
according to which the UK’s action to extradite will endanger the
applicant. It implies that the UK is also responsible for any foreseeable
consequences which occur within another jurisdiction.49 In the case of
Ng v. Canada, the HRC held that Canada’s extradition of the defendant
to the US to stand trial in California, where he was likely to face the
death penalty, constitutes a breach of Article 7 of the ICCPR. From
these two cases, it can be assumed that the state in which an individual
is physically present is obliged not only to respect the rights of that
individual, but also provide protection by not extraditing the person
to a known situation of endangerment. Here, ‘effective’ control or
‘foreseeable” consequence over a person refers to the physical presence
of an entity in a particular country.
Control over a person as a basis of extraterritorial obligation has
also prevailed in the case of issuing visas. The cases of Vida Martin v.
Uruguay, Linctenztein v. Uruguay, and Nunex v. Uruguay, all presented
before the Human Rights Committee, ended in the opinion that the
Uruguayan government’s refusal to renew the passports of its citizens
living abroad clearly is a violation of human rights.50 Therefore, Uruguay
is responsible for human rights protections over its nationals who live
abroad. It is clear, then, that states issuing visas or passports are still
responsible for human rights protections over nationals or aliens living
abroad.
There has also been a recognition of states’ responsibility to control
criminals and terrorists located in their territory, who may cause harm
Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1083, p. 165.
49
Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161, para. 91.
50
Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg:
2008), at 21 & 22.
48

375

Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein

to other states. This was confirmed in Lawless v. Ireland and McCann v.
The United Kingdom. In McCann, the Court held that governments are
‘required to have regard to their duty to protect the lives of the people
in Gibraltar including their own military personnel.’51
States may also operate abroad on the basis of ad hoc agreements
or informal arrangements of cooperation between two states. Here, the
cases of Xhavara v. Italy and Öcalan v. Turkey serve as two examples.
In the Xhavara case, involving Albanian citizens who had been trying
to enter Italy illegally when their boat sank following a collision with
an Italian warship, the ECrtHR held that since Italy was a party to the
bilateral agreement with Albania authorising the Italian Navy to board
and search Albanian boats in order to encourage illegal immigrants,
this triggered Italy’s responsibility in the incident.52 In the Öcalan case,
the Court concluded that the arrest of the PKK leader by members of
Turkish security forces at the Nairobi airport effectively brought Mr
Öcalan within Turkish authority, due to the informal arrangements that
already existed between Turkey and Kenya.53
These illustrations signify that the degree involved in ‘control
over a person’ or ‘foreseeable’ consequence is less than that for cases
requiring ‘effective’ control over individuals. The former is applied
differently, based on the physical and legal links of control which
may not be permanent. Here, the pivotal issue is the degree of control
and how it should be implemented. This implies a question about the
exact nature of the relationship between control and jurisdiction. What
kind of control triggers jurisdiction and state responsibility? Is it all
types? Moreover, control over what? No answer remains. Despite these
remaining ambiguities, the cases described provide some basis for
invoking the extraterritorial responsibility of home states.
3. Jurisdiction based on Decisive Influence Standards
In additional to effective control, extraterritorial human rights
obligations can also be based on looser criteria – namely, the decisive
McCann and Other Judgements, 27 Sept. 1995, Series, A. No. 324.
European Court of Human Rights, Xhavara and Others V. Italy and Albania, Application No. 39473/98, 2001, Decision.
53
European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan V. Turkey, Application no. 46221/99,
2005, Judgment, paras. 16, 90 - 99.
51
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influence standard. One interesting related case is Ilascu and others v.
Moldova and Russia, before the European Court of Human Rights. In
this case, the Court had to determine whether detainees in the breakaway
region of Trandniestria, Moldova lay within the jurisdiction of Russia,
by virtue of Russia’s support for rebel forces there, yet, conversely, had
to determine whether the detainees could fall within the jurisdiction
of Molvoda. Here, the Court stated that the fact of Moldova’s loss of
effective control over the separatist regime did not discharge the country
from its positive obligations to take all diplomatic, economic, judicial
or other measures in its power to secure release of the applicants.54 In
other words, the reduction of the actual power to act did not discharge
its positive obligations. However, since the Moldavian Republic of
Transdniestria (MRT) forces were under the ‘effective control, or at
the very least decisive influence’ of Russia, as the forces survived ‘by
virtue of the military, economic, financial, and political support’ given
by that country,55 the ECrtHR found that Russia was responsible for
harm caused by authorities to the applicants in the breakaway region
of the MRT.56 The Court also attributed responsibility to Russia for not
having taken foreseeable action to prevent the abuses in question.57
Applying the Ilascu reasoning of decisive influence, one can argue
that home states are responsible for MNC operating abroad, provided
that it gives them economic, financial, or political support.58 Narula
Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg:
2008).
55
European Court of Human Rights, Ilascu V. Russia & Moldova, Appl. 48787/99,
2004, para. 392.
56
The Russia refused of exercising control over MRT as it had only a peacekeeping
mission (military deployment) to preserve peace and stability in the region and its
presence is approved by Moldova. Ibid., paras. 356, 357, 393 & 441.
57
Ibid; Narula, Smita, “The Jurisdictional Scope of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational
Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg, Netherland: 2008), p. 23.
58
Narula, Smita, “The Jurisdictional Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational
Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg, Netherland: 2008), p. 24.
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lists several other possible influences by the home state, including the
negotiation, drafting, ratification and enforcement of various bilateral
or multilateral investment treaties on the legal rights of MNC, as well
as government guarantee or insurance for various risky projects.59 The
government’s supportive role is also apparent when acting as a loan
guarantor for MNC before international financial institutions, providing
diplomatic immunity, and representing them at international dispute
settlements. It is clear that in many cases, home state support is vital to
an MNC’s survival in the host country.
4. Jurisdiction based on the capacity to influence
Another ‘loose’ criterion for establishing state’s responsibility is
provided in the 2007 Genocide case, under the category of due diligence
standards:
The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the
capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or
already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other
things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene
of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of
all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in
the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal
criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may
vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and
persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the other hand,
it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or
even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide.
As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach
of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility
remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with
its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result - averting the commission of genocide - which the efforts of only one State were insufficient
to produce.60

To apply this case to the current issue under discussion, the home state
should have the capacity to effectively influence actions of MNC that are
Ibid., pp. 23 & 24.
International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina V. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 430.
59
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likely to commit human rights violations. The determination of capacity
to influence is conducted deductively depending on the geographical
proximity of the state concerned, relevant events, and the strength of
political and other bonds. Here, the principle of reasonableness, which
is commonly applied in the US in the context of antitrust law, in section
403 (2) of the Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, applies when determining the strongest connection.
61
If the event has taken place far from the home state’s territory, the
exercise of jurisdiction will be considered unreasonable.62 This does
not mean that human rights violations occurring in other countries will
not trigger home state responsibility, but rather, that this determination
is based on the location of the MNC’s action or omission. One way of
filling the legal gap resulting from geographical distance is through a
parent company, which resides in the home country and has subsidiaries
in other countries. Through territorial jurisdiction exercised over the
parent company, the home state may exercise de facto ‘control’ or
‘influence’ over foreign subsidiaries whose conduct in some respect
depends on the parent company’s corporate decisions. Consequently,
the home country is capable of extending the material reach of their
influence over foreign activities of MNCs.63 In this case, the parameters
for determining home state responsibility become intertwined with
those determining the responsibility of home corporations,64 due to
the economic-legal medium of corporate management. Then, in order
to avoid state responsibility, home states should prevent violations
from occurring or, if such violation occurs, it should hold the MNC
accountable.
Restatement of the Third Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States Restatement of the Law, ed. The American Law Institute, vol. 1 (St Paul, American Law
Institute Publishers, 1986), section 403 (2).
62
Ryngaert, Cedric, “Discussion Paper “ ESF Explanatory Workshop on Transnational Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(Tilburg: 2008).
63
Francioni, Francesco, “Exporting Environment Hazard through Multinational Enterprise: Can a State of Origin Be Held Responsible?,” International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, eds. Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 284.
64
Ryngaert, Cedric, “Discussion Paper “ ESF Explanatory Workshop on Transnational Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(Tilburg: 2008).
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Apart from geographical proximity, the determination of the
capacity to influence should also be based on legal criteria, determined
by international law. Here, all connections provided in the doctrine
of jurisdiction as permissible,65 as well as obligatory connections
mentioned earlier, can be applied. The principles of nationality abroad,
substantial or intended substantial effect, and universal jurisdiction can
be used to assess states’ capacity to influence and thus, its international
responsibility. In this case, states may be held responsible for violations
by MNC, provided that these MNCs carry the home state’s nationality,
the corporation’s activity abroad has a substantial effect on home
states, or the violation constitutes an international crime with universal
jurisdiction. Another scenario, as mentioned earlier, is the application
of obligatory connection. Through effective control of MNC, or
economically and politically supporting them through loan guarantees,
investments and other channels, home states may have the capacity to
influence MNC’s behaviour. Then, the failure of the former to set proper
conditions by which that corporation may receive support, or its failure
to redress violations by the entity, can trigger state’s responsibility of
due diligence. Here, individuals whose ESC rights are violated by MNC
abroad also fall under home state jurisdiction.
This capacity of home states to influence may serve as a means of
establishing jurisdiction leading to state responsibility, by providing
flexible standards for interpreting the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ over
non-state actors and imposing obligations to home countries; in
contrast, the other criteria discussed above cannot. The difficulty arises
in establishing the necessary connection and applying the principle of
reasonableness, which requires close relationships between the states,
individuals or activities to be regulated.66 If that link between the state
and the entity/activity is strong, and if other states’ sovereign interests
are not intruded upon, bringing an individual or entity under a certain
state responsibility is reasonable.67 This also implies that despite the
65
66

Ibid.

Restatement of the Third Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States Restatement
of the Law, ed. The American Law Institute, vol. 1 (St Paul, American Law Institute Publishers,
1986), section 403 (2).

Ryngaert, Cedric, “Discussion Paper “ ESF Explanatory Workshop on Transnational Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(Tilburg: 2008).
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strong linkage between individuals and their home state, the latter
should not be obliged to protect individual human rights if this would
violate the principle of non-intervention. Here, sovereignty limits the
practice of jurisdiction.
This construction does not mean that a state is not entitled to
regulate and protect individuals in other countries; only that it is not
obliged to do so.68 Here, the concept of jurisdiction is perceived as a
continuum.69 On one side, states are obliged under human rights treaties
to protect individuals under their jurisdiction, if a link exists between
the individual and that state. At the other extreme, states cannot protect
individuals not falling under its jurisdiction, if the aforementioned
connection is weak, or other states have an overriding interest.70
B. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
AND COOPERATION
In the context of economy, social, and cultural rights, Articles 2 (1),
11, 15, 22, and 23 of the ICESCR concerning international assistance and
cooperation represent examples of how the extraterritorial obligation to
protect can be created. But, what is meant by international assistance or
cooperation? Who should give assistance? The ICESCR in its General
Comments no. 14, 15, 17, and 18, clearly states that ‘states parties and
other actors are in a position to assist’, should provide ‘international
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical which
enable developing countries to fulfil their core obligations.’ Here,
the ICESCR is clearly distinguishing obligations to assist that rest on
developed countries or any entities having the capacity to assist others;
as a consequence, developing countries that are unable to fulfil their
obligations under the Covenant should seek assistance, and use it to
comply with the core content of the rights.71
Ibid.
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
See further discussion on obligation of assistance recipient in meeting the conditions imposed to receive such assistance in Sepúlveda, Magdalena, “Obligations of
‘Internaitonal Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocl to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” Netherland Quarterly of Human Rights 24.2 (2006), p. 291.
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The CESCR does not specifically elaborate which fields can receive
assistance, and the type of assistance that can be given. This depends
on the particular needs of the recipient, and the state of cooperation
between that recipient and assistant provider. However, several General
Comments highlight the importance of financial, technical, relief and
emergency assistance fulfilling ESC rights such as health,72 water,73 and
food,74 as well as the prohibition of embargo or similar measures that
could negatively affect enjoyment of ESC rights.75 Moreover, the use of
legal and political assistance to influence third parties to respect these
rights is allowed, as long as this is in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and applicable law.76 This implies that the meaning of
international assistance or cooperation includes regulatory frameworks,
or any legal assistance. Cooperation and assistance may be exercised on
a collective as well as individual basis through international or regional
organisations, as well as bilaterally.
In short, the duty to cooperate is a general duty which incorporates
other layers of obligation, and in fact, serves as the basis for applying
extraterritorial obligations. This cooperation may take a direct form, or
indirectly by not objecting to extraterritorial measures by other states.
With respect to extraterritorial regulation of corporate human rights
responsibility, home state regulation and adjudication of corporate
human rights responsibility should be viewed in terms of such
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, the
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Twenty-second session, 2000
sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 2000.
73
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, the
Right to Water, Twenty-ninth Session, 2003 sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 2002,
para. 34.
74
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, Right
to Adequate Food, Twentieth session, 1999 sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, 1999,
para. 36.
75
Ibid., para. 37; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, the Right to Water, Twenty-ninth Session, 2003 sess., U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11, 2002, para. 32.
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Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, the
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Twenty-second session, 2000
sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 2000, para. 39; Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, the Right to Water, Twenty-ninth Session,
2003 sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 2002, para. 39.
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cooperation. In this respect, home state regulation can be considered a
part of human rights obligation.
V. SOME LIMITATIONS
Although the extraterritorial regulation was justified, some
limitations should be applied.
A. EXTRATERRITORIAL
REGULATION
VERSUS
PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
As mentioned, the principle of non-intervention delimits the
application of extraterritorial obligations. In international law, this
important principle is simply defined as the prohibition against the use
of political, economic, and other coercive means, by a state or group
of states, for any reason, to either directly or indirectly force another
state to behave in a certain way, where that state enjoys autonomy
and freedom.77 This principle is embodied in various international
instruments and jurisprudence, as well as established and substantial
state practice, indicating the existence of opinio juris of states. 78 It is
also important to note that non-intervention emphasizes the competition
between the various interests of states.
The development of human rights under international law since 1945
has challenged this non-intervention doctrine. A closer examination
of the relationship between the two priorities reveals two different
purposes. The field of human rights developed to protect the interest
Franz Xaver Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty: From Independence to Interdependence in the Structure of International Environmental Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2000), p. 150; Jr Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond and Margaret G. Hermann, “The Rise and Fall of the Nonintervention Norm: Some Correlates
and Potential Consequences,” Fletcher Forum World Affair 22 (1998).
78
Article 8 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
Article 15 of the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 8 of
the 1945 Charter of the League of Arab States, and Article 3 of the 1963 Charter of
the Organization of African Unity, Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965 on the Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of their Independence and Sovereignty, the General Assembly Resolution 2131 para
1, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation.
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of individuals and groups, while non-intervention developed to protect
states from involvement by other states in their affairs. However, what
if the state interest fails to coincide with the individual interest; where
does one concept end and the other begin? States, with an interest in
attracting investors, may provide privileges and protection to business
actors at the expense of individuals, or refuse to provide extraterritorial
protection when the absence of ratification frees the home country from
extraterritorial obligation. As a result, there is the risk of individual
interests being overridden by state interests. If such a situation arises,
can human rights clauses be used as justification to override the principle
of non-intervention?
There are two ways of approaching this issue: by stressing the
dichotomy between internal and international jurisdiction; and through
deeper understanding of the notion of non-intervention. As state
practices change, so do these two elements.
The example can be found in the context of humanitarian
intervention. The right to intervene for humanitarian purposes has been
reformulated in the context of ‘responsibility to protect’, where the
intervention is no longer perceived as a right but rather an obligation
of states, when other states are unwilling and unable to protect their
own citizens from avoidable catastrophes - including the violation of
human rights. In this case, the protection of the victim may be seen as
an overriding justification that trumps the principle of non-intervention.
This does not mean that any case involving violations or threats to
human rights automatically leads to the ‘obligation to intervene’; only
that such an obligation, based on the scale of need, be invoked as a last
resort when the concerned state fails to protect the victim.79 It should be
construed in the broad and positive sense interpreted by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.80
While this interpretation of intervention has been used in a military
context for humanitarian intervention, it is questioned whether state
practice supports this argument in a non-military, extraterritorial,
regulatory framework. Some proposals have been made to include
The Responsibility to Protect, (The International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, December 2001), p. vii.
80
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79

384

Justifying Extraterritorial Regulations of Home Country

human rights protection as one criterion to be used in balancing state
interest. The classical example is crimes against humanity or other
international crimes in which there is universal jurisdiction, where all
states have interest and are obliged to prevent such crimes and prosecute
the perpetrator. Another such attempt has been made regarding sex
tourism. The UK government, for example, proposes various factors
to be used in balancing the state interest and the victim’s need, such as
the seriousness of offence, degree of danger, vulnerability of victims,
existence of international obligations, form of violence, and the the
reputation of the UK before international community. The G8 has
articulated a similar proposal regarding sex tourism, whereby in order to
combat child exploitation effectively, extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
home country over foreign costumers should be allowed. The reasoning
behind such a policy is premised on the inability or unwillingness of the
destination country to deal with sex tourism and the mobility of foreign
customers.81 While such proposals are usually based on the nationality
principle, the protection of victims has also been a consideration in
cases of potential conflict of interests between states. No objections
have been raised.
Meanwhile, several draft regulations providing for the extraterritorial
regulation of MNC abroad have been issued by several countries, such
as the US Draft Corporate Code of Conduct Act 2000, Australian
Draft Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, and UK 2003 Corporate
Responsibility Bill; however, since none of these passed, there is
no way of testing their challenge to the non-intervention principle.
Interestingly, one of the considerations for the failure of the Australian
Code in 2000 was not due to the possible objection of the host country,
but rather the fear that the home state’s extraterritorial regulation would
be perceived by other countries – especially developing ones – as

Because many destination countries lack the resources to investigate and prosecute
all reports of child exploitation, including by foreigners who may well have left their
country before the abuse is even reported, or do not have legislation concerning child
exploitation, the extraterritorial reach of these laws prevents destination countries
from becoming zones where those who sexually exploit children can act with impunity. See: G8 Experience in the Implementation of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Sex
Crimes against Children, (18 April 2007).
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‘arrogant, patronising, paternalistic and racist.’82 This highlights how
sovereignty can be a sensitive question for both home and host states.
To conclude, redefining the concept of sovereignty to include human
rights protection has opened the door to an expansive understanding
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Theoretically, the principle of nonintervention can be violated if the foreign state has an overriding interest
pursued on the basis of human rights. Still, this practice is in embryonic
form, and needs to be developed further.
B. ARE
HUMAN
RIGHTS
A
DOMESTIC
OR
INTERNATIONAL ISSUE?
Are human rights as applied to corporate responsibility, a domestic
matter? Many states have argued that social affairs, human rights, and
the environment are domestic in nature. The US Restatement clearly
defines industrial and labour relations, health and safety practices, or
conduct related to the preservation or control of the local environment
to conclusively fall under the discretion of each country; therefore,
any extraterritorial regulation of such issues is not permissible.83 The
basis for this conclusion is not only conceptual but practical; such
issues are highly dependent on local circumstances, and thus, diversity
should be maintained.84 However, the inclusions of human rights in
the United Nations Charter that are binding upon all members, and
the establishment of jus cogens as well as treaties, customs and other
means of international obligation, demonstrate that the human rights
are no longer exclusively domestic. Moreover, the existence of an
international human rights monitoring system to deal with breaches
of international law serves as further evidence that human rights no
longer fall only under domestic jurisdiction. Today, states cannot claim
domestic jurisdiction to justify the violation of human rights; how states
Report on the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, (Parliamentary Joint Statutory
Committee on Corporations adn Securities, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, June 2001), p. 45.
83
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relation, 1987,
213.
84
Jennifer A. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 136 - 137; Thierry Berthet, Philippe Cuntigh
and Christophe Guitton, “Employment Policy and Territories,” Training & Employment 46 Jan-Mar (2000).
82

386

Justifying Extraterritorial Regulations of Home Country

treat their own citizens is no longer perceived as their own business.
This is not to say that the international arena is always the best context
for addressing these matters, but simply to point to how much the scope
of domestic jurisdiction has diminished as international law continues
to develop in this area.85 If the line drawn for human rights represents
that marking the permissible intervention in states,86 this line is not
fixed, but varies both temporally and geographically depending on
other developments in international relations.
This shift in thought from a domestic to an international paradigm
has implications for the current discussion. While many business issues
are still domestic concerns, many others have gained international
attention. This is due to the interdependent and transnational nature of
MNC, and the complicating factor of the relationship between home
and host country, as well as a general increase in the attention focused
worldwide on human rights issue. This, in turn, has complicated the
field of corporate human rights responsibility as it applies to both
domestic and international arenas.
VI.CONCLUSION
In the context of regulatory framework, the regulation of MNC
is actually far less extraterritorial in nature than the term suggests.
Principally, such regulation affects only the corporation which is
incorporated or has central management within the territory of a state,
but operates abroad through its corporate branches. In this case, the
closeness of contact is mostly a function of two factors: the nationality
principle, and managerial control. Extraterritorial regulation by one
state with respect to the activity of a corporate parent, subsidiary or
other member of a multinational, is enforced directly toward members
of the group established in the territory of the regulating state, which
may be considered to have the ‘nationality’ of that state.87 This signifies
Dominic McGoldrick, “The Principle of Non-Intervention: Human Rights,” The
United Nations and the Principles of International Law: Essays in Memory of Micael
Akehurst, eds. Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick (Routledge, 1994), p. 86.
86
Ibid., pp. 86 & 87.
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that the regulation is a national one, and therefore meets the minimum
contact requirement.
However, the national regulation of a multinational enterprise may be
multinational in effect; extraterritorially, therefore, state are required to
consider the potential or actual effect of their exercise of jurisdiction on
other states.88 For example, if home state legislation imposed a specific
labour or environmental standard which differed from the environmental
standard imposed in the host state (and for which there is no existing
international standard), a conflict may exist between the home state
and host state law. Nevertheless, not all apparent conflicts are really
conflicts. The general rule is that a conflict exists where compliance
with the law of one forum results in a violation of the law of another. In
other words, there is a conflict if it is impossible to comply with both
laws at the same time. Thus, the general rule is to try to balance state
interests. Here, it is proposed that human rights argument be brought
into play. The question is no longer the one of which state interest
deserves protection, but rather, whether a need exists for human rights
protection. Therefore, initiatives designed to give effect to established
principles of human rights should not automatically be regarded as
interference, even where an initiative has gone beyond that which is
strictly necessary to give effect to human rights. As pointed out, this
extraterritorial regulation would not usually be considered ‘unjustified’
where a significant degree of international consensus exists on an issue.
Moreover, the divisions between domestic and international affairs,
competing of state and individual interests against the background of
emerging human rights protection, and the variety of legal techniques for
exerting pressure, signify changes in the principle of non-intervention,
whose direction will be determined by state practice. The boundary
between national and international affairs has not been bridged or
erased, but circumvented. Such a distinction may thus no longer be
necessary or helpful, since it becomes a potential source of confusion.
To conclude, it is argued here that in the context of jurisdiction,
extraterritorial regulation is not about the right of a State to govern its
own interest within its jurisdiction and/or other jurisdiction but it is also
about obligation to State to do so in the context of human rights.
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